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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
VERA MASON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by defendant of her conviction 
of threft in the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
In a jury trial in the lower court, defendant was 
found guilty of third degree felony theft and subsequently 
sentenced to be confined in the Utah State Prison by the 
Case No. 
13642 
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Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson for the indeterminate term 
as provided by law for said crime. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the lower court 
decision. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The defendant was charged with the theft of a cash 
register belonging to one Harold A. Lindsey on or about 
the 18th day of September, 1973. The cash register was 
located on the premises of a gas station owned by lind-
sey. 
Lindsey in testimony in the lower court identified 
defendant as the party driving the car used in the rob-
bery. 
The facts before the trial court were as follows: On 
or about the 18th day of September, 1973, defendant 
Vera Mason, accompanied by Melvin J. Thomas, drove 
into a gas station owned and operated by Harold A. 
Lindsey. Thomas asked Lindsey to put three dollars 
worth of gas in the car (T. 10). While servicing the car 
with gas Lindsey cleaned the car windows and at that 
time observed defendant from a distance of not more 
thn eighteen inches (T. 12). After receiving payment 
for the gas from defendant (T. 13), Lindsey returned 
to hi station office where Thomas asked him for change 
to make a phone call (T. 13). Lindsey gave Thomas the 
change and then left the office and continued servicing 
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a car in the lube bay (T. 13). Lindsey later became 
suspicious after seeing Thomas stooped over the opened 
back door of the car (T. 14), and returned to the station 
office and found the cash register gone (T. 15). At the 
same time he saw the car defendant was driving exit the 
station at an excessive rate of speed (T. 16). 
After the introduction of other testimony the defen-
dant took the stand and denied that she had been in 
Lindsey's station on the day in question (T. 65). On 
cross-examination the prosecution in an attempt to im-
peach defendant's credibility asked the following ques-
tions: 
"Q. Mrs. Mason, are you now under the 
influence of any drugs? 
MR. K U N K L E R : I will object to the 
question. I don't see the relevancy. 
MR. A N D E R S O N : I feel it goes to 
her credibility, Your Honor. 
T H E COURT: You may answer. 
A. Somewhat, yes. 
Q. By "somewhat", would you tell us 
when you last took a drug and what it was ? 
A. About, let's see, about 8:30 this morn-
ing. 
Q. What did you take at 8:30 this morn-
ing? 
A. Heroin. 
Q. Heroin? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Mrs. Mason are you a heroin ad-
dict? 
MR. K U N K L E R : I object to the ques-
tion. I don't think she would even know wheth-
er she was or not. 
T H E COURT: I sustain that objec-
tion. 
Q. How much heroin did you take? 
MR. K U N K L E R : I object. I don't see 
the relativity. 
T H E COURT: Overruled. How much? 
A. About two ten-dollar caps. 
T H E COURT: Two what? 
T H E W I T N E S S : Ten-dollar bal-
loons. 
Q. Two ten-dollar ballons. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you consider yourself now as be-
ing under full control of your faculties? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you high? 
A. No, I'm not. 
The state then called David W. King, a police officer, 
with extensive work in narcotics. To establish him as 
an expert, the state questioned Officer King as to his 
experience in the field of narcotics: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Q. Would you tell us what this train-
ing and experience is, please? 
A. I have had two and a half years in 
narcotics. A year of that was spent in under-
cover living and making purchases of heroin 
from heroin dealers and users, which by and 
large in this state is basically the same. I have 
been to a narcotics school. I have been to the 
Maryland State Narcotics Seminar. I have 
been, of course, to our Police Academy rela-
itve to narcotics investigations. And then my 
experience has probably been by far the great-
est teacher relative to narcotics investigations, 
or observing people in narcotics, etc., different 
types of narcotics. 
Officer King then testified as to the probable affect of 
defendant's use of heroin at the time of trial (T. 69-73). 
After both sides rested their cases, the court specific-
ally instructed the jury in the following manner. 
T H E COURT: Members of the jury, 
there has been some evidence introduced in this 
case about the use of heroin. The Court in-
structs the jury this way. I won't put it in my 
written instructions because I didn't anticipate 
it and don't have anything prepared on that 
in writing. 
However, if you find that the defendant 
has committed some other crime or some in-
discretion that's not in the pleadings and of 
which she is not charged with today you can't 
find her guilty on the crime charged because 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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she's guilty of something elese. If she is guilty 
of using heroin, you can't find her guilty of 
this theft because she's guilty of heroin. I t isn't 
a question of whether or not a person ought to 
be punished it's a question of whether she's 
guilty of this particular charge. And inasmuch 
as you don't determine punishment, the Court 
has to do that, you are to disregard this testi-
mony about the use of heroin with reference to 
punishment or guilt. 
And furthermore, you are instructed not 
to indulge in any bias or prejudice against her 
because of the use of heroin. That is not the 
crime that is charged. 
Now, the testimony has been admitted 
and the Court let it in for one purpose only, 
and that purpose is for you to try to determine 
what her mental condition is right now, that is, 
at the time she testified. And you have had 
some testimony about how much she took and 
when, and you may consider that just in de-
termining whether you can believe what she has 
testified to, whether she's able to testify co-
herently and reasonably about things that hap-
pened on the date on which she is charged with 
this theft charge. So you consider it to deter-
mine her present mental condition as you can 
properly evaluate her testimony. But it's not 
to be prejudicial against her on the particular 
charge. . . (T-75-76) 
The jury after deliberating found defendant guilty 
of the charge. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
NO ERROR WAS PRESENT IN THE CROSS-
EXAMINATION OF DEFENDANT AS TO 
HER USE OF DRUGS ON THE DAY OF 
TRIAL. 
A. THE INJECTION BY DEFENDANT OF 
TWO "BALLOONS" OF HEROIN ON 
THE MORNING OF THE TRIAL WAS 
A PROPER SUBJECT FOR CROSS-EX-
AMINATION IN ORDER TO EVALU-
ATE HER CREDIBILITY AS A WIT-
NESS. 
Respondent respectfully submits that the lower court 
properly overruled defense counsel's objection to the 
state's cross-examination of defendant-appellant as to 
her use and addition to drugs at the time of trial. Rule 
20, Utah Rules of Evidence states: 
"Subject to rules 21 and 22, for the pur-
poses of impairing or supporting the credi-
bility of a witness, any party including the 
party calling him may examine him and intro-
duce extrinsic evidence concerning any state-
ment or conduct by him and any other matter 
relevant upon the issue of credibility. (Em-
phasis added.) 
The above cited rule specifically provides that a witness 
may be examined as to his or her conduct or "any other 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
matter relevant upon the issue of credibility." The rec-
ognized debilitating affect upon the mental processes of 
drug addiction requires that the jury be informed of such 
drug addiction so that in th einterest of justice, the tes-
timony of the drug user may be properly evaluated. The 
very essence of the American judicial system is the pre-
sentation of credible evidence before the trier of fact to 
enable the rendering of a just verdict based on facts 
adduced from said evidence together with the applicable 
law. In determining the credibility of the evidence pre-
sented, justice requires that an examination of the source 
be made. 
The above view has been set forth in an annotation 
on the use of drugs as affecting the credibility of a wit-
ness, 52 A. L. R. 2d 848, which sets forth the majority 
view as allowing the introduction of such evidence when 
it is proven: 
"that the witness was under the [opium, 
morphine or similar drugs] influence at the 
time of the occurrences as to which he testifies 
or at the time of the trial, or that his mind or 
memory or powers of observation were affected 
by the habit." (Emphasis added.) 52 A. L. R. 
2d 848. 
This same excerpt is alluded to in appellant's brief but 
never cited in text. As can be seen, while questioning 
as to addiction to drugs may be irrelevant in determining 
the witness' propensity for truth, it is relevant as to 
capacity where, as in the case at bar, the witness admits 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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that she had on the morning of the trial injected "two 
ten-dollar caps" of heroin (T. 67). 
The Supreme Court of Kansas adopted this view 
in the case of State v. Belote, 213 Kan. 291, 516 P. 2d 
159 (1973). In this case the Court ruled proper the re-
striction of cross-examination as to drug use of the state's 
undercover agent where it was shown that neither at the 
time of the alleged purchase testified of nor at the time 
of trial was the witness under the influence of narcotics. 
It should be noted that a rule of evidence identical to 
our Rule 20, at K. S. A. 60-420, in addition to the anno-
tation at 52 A. L. R. 2d 848 previously cited served as 
authority for this restriction. A like position was ad-
hered to by the Arizona Supreme Court in the case of 
State v. Reyes, 99 Ariz. 257, 408 P. 2d 400 (1965), where 
said court held: 
"The trial court did not err in sustaining 
the objection to the question 'Have you ever 
taken heroin yourself?' The question is too 
broad. Generally a witness may be cross-exam-
ined as to whether he is under the influence of 
drugs at the time of testifying. [Citations 
omitted.] In the instant case the court did per-
mit testimony as to the witness being under the 
influence of drugs at the time of his testimony. 
'Q. Are you under the influence of 
of drugs right now? 
'A. No, sir. '" Id at 402. (Emphasis 
added.) 
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Once again the general rule as set forth in appellant's 
brief is that an individual witness for purposes of impeach-
ment may be cross-examined as to whether he is under 
the influence of drugs at the time of testifying. For other 
holdings in conformity with this rule see: People v. 
Perez, 239 Cal. App. 2d 1, 48 Cal. Rptr. 596 (1966); 
United States v. Folwer, 465 F. 2d 664 (D. C. Cir. 1972); 
Wilson v. United States, 232 U. S. 563, 34 S. Ct. 347, 58 
L. Ed. 728 (1918); United States v. Butler, 481 F. 2d 531 
(D. C. Cir. 1973); People v. Smith, 4 Cal. App. 3d 403, 
64 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1970); Isonhood v. State, (Miss.) 274 
So. 2d 685 (1973). 
A more liberal rule would allow cross-examination as 
to drug abuse generally at the time of trial without the 
need to establish drug addiction. See State v. Cox, (Mis-
souri 352 S. W. 2d 665 (1962); State v. Collins, (Mis-
souri) 383 S. W. 2d 747 (1964), People v. Strother, 53 
111. 2d 95, 290 N. E. 2d 201 (1972). 
From the authorities here set forth and acknowl-
edged in appellant's brief no error was committed in 
allowing defendant to be cross-examined as to her addic-
tion to drugs at the time of trial. 
B. PROPER FOUNDATION WAS PRES-
ENT IN THE CROSS-EXAMINATION 
OF DEFENDANT AS TO HER USE OF 
DRUGS ON THE DAY OF THE TRIAL. 
Appellant maintains that reversible error was com-
mitted because of a lack of proper foundation in the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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prosecution's impeachment of defendant. While quick 
to make this naked allegation, appellant fails to specify 
wherein the prosecution failed to establish proper foun-
dation. At trial an objection was raised on grounds of 
irrelevance when the issue of defendant's drug addiction 
was raised. On appeal, defendant-appellant concedes that 
drug addiction at the time of trial is a relevant issue for 
the purposes of impeachment but then contradicts this 
statement by maintaining that reversible error was com-
mitted because the prosecution failed to establish proper 
foundation, i.e., failed to establish the relevancy of the 
inquiry as to drug addiction in the lower court. The in-
consistency of this position is obvious. 
As previously set forth in both briefs, drug addiction 
at the time of trial or at the time of the event testified 
of is extremely relevant with respect to the weight to be 
afforded the testimony of a particular witness. The ques-
tion was therefore proper and the lower court properly 
overruled defense counsel's objection. 
Appellant cites as authority the case of People v. 
Telio, 1 111. App. 3d 526, 275 N. E. 2d 222 (1971), for the 
proposition that reversible error is committed when cross-
examination is commenced on the question of drug use 
without proper foundation. Respondent would point out 
that the Illinois court, while finding error in such a prac-
tice, stated that said error did not form sufficient grounds 
for reversal. Therefore, even if in the case at bar proper 
foundation was not laid, no basis for reversal would exist. 
Respondent respectfully submits that proper founda-
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tion was present in the questioning of defendant as to 
her use of drugs at the time of trial. Respondent further 
submits that even if proper foundation was not laid, such 
error was not of sufficient magnitude in light of the eye-
witness identification of defendant as the party driving 
the car involved in the robbery of the service station, to 
warrant reversal. 
C. APPELLANT'S ADMISSION IN OPEN 
COURT THAT SHE HAD INJECTED 
TWO BALLOONS OF HEROIN THE 
MORNING OF THE TRIAL, TOGETHER 
WITH EXPERT TESTIMONY AS TO 
THE EFFECT OF SUCH AN INTAKE 
WAS SUFFICIENT FOR PURPOSES OF 
IMPEACHMENT. 
Defendant-appellant admitted under cross-examina-
tion that at the time of trial she was under the influence 
of a narcotic drug (T. 66). Upon further quesitioning 
she testified that she had taken two "ten-dollar ballons" 
of heroin at 8:30 the morning of trial (T. 67). These 
admissions by defendant were sufficient to serve as a 
basis for impeachment and it was not necessary for the 
prosecution to introduce further evidence of drug use 
at the time of trial. The introduction of further evidence, 
i.e., requiring defendant to display any needle tracks in 
her arms, etc., would possibly have unduly influenced 
the jury. Once again such a showing was not required 
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since defendant voluntarily admitted that she was under 
the influence of the drug heroin at the time of trial. 
Appellant cites the case of People v. Ortega, 2 Cal. 
App. 3d 888, 83 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969) for the proposition 
that the prosecution is required to introduce indepen-
dent evidence of drug use at critical times. It should be 
noted that this case may be distinguished from the case 
at bar for the following reasons. In the present action, 
unlike, Ortega, the witness voluntarily admitted that she 
was under the influence of drugs at the time of trial. In 
addition, nowhere in the present action does there appear 
the badgering type questioning on the use of drugs that 
was present in Ortega. There does not here exist the 
insinuation in the prosecution's questions that appeared 
in Ortega. For the above reasons respondent respectfully 
submits that the cross-examination was proper in all 
respect. 
POINT II. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN ALLOWING OFFICER 
DAVID W. KING TO TESTIFY AS TO THE 
PROBABLE EFFECTS ON DEFENDANT OF 
HER DRUG USE AT THE TIME OF TRIAL. 
Utah law provides for the use of expert testimony 
or the use of opinion testimony: 
(2) If the witness is testifying as an ex-
pert, testimony of the witness in the form of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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opinions or inferences is limited to such opin-
ions as the judge finds are (a) based on facts 
or data perceived by or personally known or 
made known to the witness at the hearing and 
(b) within the scope of the special knowledge, 
skill, experience or training possessed by the 
witness. 
(3) Unless the judge excludes the testi-
mony he shall be deemed to have made the find-
ing requisite to its admission. Rule 56, Utah 
Rules of Evidence. (Emphasis added.) 
This rule supports respondent's position that Officer 
King's testimony was admissible as expert testimony. An 
expert is appropriately used to enable the jury to better 
understand matters properly before the court. Whether 
or not a particular witness has the required expertise, 
experience, special knowledge or training is left to the 
discretion of the trial judge. The judge's failure to ex-
clude testimony evidences that the necessary finding was 
made. See Rule 56, Supra. 
The exercise of such discretion will not be quickly 
overruled on appeal. 
It is well settled in Utah that a trial judge has wide 
discretion in determining whether proper foundation has 
been laid for opinion evidence. In Road Commission v. 
Silliman, 22 Utah 2d 33, 34, 418 P. 2d 347, 348 (1968), 
this Court held as follows: 
"The qualification of an expert witness is 
to be determined by the trial judge, and if he 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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determines that a witness by reason of training 
and experience can assist the jury by giving 
an opinion on a matter properly before the 
court, we on appeal should not hold that testi-
mony should be stricken unless such palpable 
ignorance of the subject matter is manifested 
by the witness as to indicate an abuse of discre-
tion on the part of the trial judge in allowing 
the witness to express an opinion in the first 
place or in refusing to grant a motion to strike 
after it has been given." 
Accord: Marsh v. Irvine, 22 Utah 2d 154, 449 P. 2d 
996 (1969); Stagmeyer v. Leatham Bros., Inc., 20 Utah 
2d 421, 439 P. 2d 279 (1969). 
In the case at bar the prosecution established Officer 
King as an expert in the following manner: 
"Q. Would you tell us what this train-
ing and experience [in narcotics is please? 
A. I have received two and a half years 
in narcotics. A year of that was spent in under-
cover living and making purchases of heroin 
from heroin dealers and users, which by and 
large in this state is basically the same. I have 
been to a narcotics school. I have been to the 
Maryland State Narcotics Seminar. I have 
been, of course, to our Police Academy rela-
tive to narcotics' investigations. And my ex-
perience has probably been by far the greatest 
teacher relative to narcotics investigations, or 
observing people in narcotics, etc., different 
types of narcotics," (T. 70). 
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That Officer King's extensive experience qualified him 
as an expert is evidenced by the court's failure to exclude 
his testimony. The presumption of correctness must nec-
essarily follow. 
Appellant contends that she was unduly prejudiced 
by Officer King's testimony generally and specifically be-
cause of some of his answers. Respondent respectfully 
submits that the inability to specifically respond to ques-
tions put to him combined with possible instances of 
vagueness went to the weight to be afforded his testi-
mony. Such an evaluation is clearly the prerogative of 
a jury and not a proper subject for appeal unless there 
is a clear abuse. No such abuse is here presented. 
Even if error was to be found in the testimony of 
Officer King such error was inconsequential in light of 
the clear and convincing evidence pointing to defendant's 
guilt. As previously stated, defendant was without ques-
tion identified as the driver of the car involved in the 
theft of a cash register from Harold A. Lindsey. Further, 
as noted in respondent's statement of the facts, the court 
specifically instructed the jury that defendant's use of 
heroin could only be considered as it affected her ability 
to testify on the day of trial (T. 75-76). 
For the above reason appellant respectfully submits 
that the testimony of Officer King was properly before 
the court and no reversible error was committed in the 
presentation of said testimony. 
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CONCLUSION 
The testimony of defendant as to her addiction to 
drugs at the time of trial and the testimony of Officer 
King as to the affect of said drug use being properly be-
fore the lower court, respondent respectfully submits that 
no basis exists for reversal of the jury verdict of guilty 
in the lower court and the same should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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